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Michael E. Parrish 2
While they sat on the bench together listening to oral arguments during the 1944 Term of the United States Supreme Court,
Felix Frankfurter scribbled a note to Frank Murphy which listed
the latter's "clients":
"Reds"
Whores
Crooks
Indians and all other colored people
Longshoremen
M'tgors [Mortgagors] and other Debtors
R.R. Employees
Pacifists
Traitors
Japs
Women
Children
Most Men3

Frankfurter wrote only partly in jest. Frank Murphy epitomized for him the judge who decided cases with his heart, not his
head, the judge who allowed his feelings of right and wrong to determine his vote without regard to something called "the rule of
law," the judge who placed results above process. He was, in brief,
the New Deal's version of James McReynolds. This perspective on
Murphy, shaped by Frankfurter and his academic disciples, who
espoused judicial restraint, "neutral principles," and other slogans
intended to muffle the voices of judges in the nation's important
policy debates, remained the orthodox one until the publication of
J. Woodford Howard's judicial biography, 4 which appeared in 1968
at the end of Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice. The constitutional revolution led by Warren and his brethren made judicial activism respectable again and encouraged a reassessment of those
I.
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earlier practitioners such as Murphy, who had prepared the soil for
the jurisprudence of the Warren era.
In his superb study of Warren published several years ago,s G.
Edward White suggested that the former Chief Justice stood alone
among twentieth-century members of the Supreme Court in his
"own reconstruction of the ethical structure of the Constitution."6
Warren, according to White, looked upon the nation's fundamental
law as more than a framework of procedural rules allocating rights
and powers. The Constitution rested upon certain ethical ideals
that gave meaning to its language and which served as the foundation of American society as well-respect for the individual, fairness, decency, compassion. When deciding particular cases, he
believed, the judge was obliged to "search for the 'Law beyond the
Law,' to discern right from wrong 'in the midst of a great confusion,' and to discover the ethical path."' Frank Murphy would
have endorsed with enthusiasm this conception of the judicial role.
During his brief tenure on the Court, which lasted from 1940 until
1949, an era marked by World War II and the beginnings of the
Cold War, he alone among the Justices remained, as Osmond K.
Fraenkel noted, "a consistent upholder of liberty."s
Murphy, who had served as Governor of Michigan during the
sit-down strikes in the automobile industry and as Roosevelt's Attorney General, came to the Court at an important turning point in
its history. In the wake of the "constitutional revolution" of 1937,
the trauma of the Court-packing battle, and the appointment of
four new Justices by Franklin Roosevelt, the Court groped for a
new philosophy and a new institutional role. Judicial activism,
equated with the notorious substantive due process of the LochnerAdkins era, had been discredited. Few areas of economic and social
life seemed beyond the reach of governmental controls following
opinions such as Parrish,9 Jones & Laughlin,to and Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis.t•
The leading figures on the chastened Court-Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Harlan Stone-all espoused some form of judicial restraint which affirmed that the Justices had no special powers
of constitutional exegesis and should therefore humble themselves
before the majoritarian sentiments manifested in the decisions of
5. G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982).
6. Jd. at 359.
7. Jd. at 225.
8. S. FINE, supra note 3, at 404.
9. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
10. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. l (1937).
ll. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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Congress, the President, and the administrative bureaucracy. Black
looked to the text of the Constitution, especially to the Bill of
Rights, as the source of judicial limitation; Frankfurter, skeptical of
this textual fundamentalism, argued that the limits flowed from history, precedent, and self-generated institutional prudence; Stone
sought a formula that would restrict judicial intervention into the
sphere of economic policy, but encourage it with respect to civil
rights and liberties.12
Contradictions abounded. The fundamentalist Black, who
would not tolerate governmental encroachments upon political
speech, the press, or the free exercise of religion, did not read the
first amendment's establishment clause in such an absolute fashion.
Nor did he place the fourth amendment upon the same plane of
constitutional respect as the first. Frankfurter, the apostle of judicial restraint and constitutional relativism, became an absolutist
with respect to both the establishment clause and the fourth amendment. Stone, who advocated that the Justices show a tender regard
for "discrete and insular minorities," did not extend such judicial
protection to leaders of the Communist Party or JapaneseAmericans.
Frank Murphy displayed far greater consistency in his jurisprudence than Black, Frankfurter, or Stone. He believed that the
Constitution had been intended to protect personal liberty and that
the Justices had a special obligation to defend freedom at a time
when, because of economic calamity and war, the coercive powers
of government had grown dangerously large. For Murphy, freedom
also meant more than the absence of physical restraint by government. It presupposed an environment of economic security and opportunity that made it possible for ordinary citizens to have greater
choice about their lives. Unlike Frankfurter, for instance, he saw
nothing contradictory in the Justices affirming broad governmental
powers with respect to workmen's compensation or fair labor standards, but curbing governmental powers over speech, press, and
political association. From his perspective, both sanctioned greater
personal freedom, the ultimate constitutional value.
With the exception of cases such as Thornhill v. Alabamai3 and
Schneiderman v. United States, 14 Murphy seldom had the opportunity to express his jurisprudence as the view of the Court. More
frequently, he found himself compelled to write concurring opinions
12.
13.
14.

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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or dissents. And what a record of dissent he compiled. Had Murphy's views prevailed, the Supreme Court would have:
-Overruled Olmstead v. United States,Is and placed
sharp restraints upon wire-tapping and electronic surveillance by the federal government in the 1940's rather than the
1960's.
-Declared invalid the military's expulsion of the Japanese-Americans from the West Coast.
-Overruled Caminetti v. United States, 16 which had
turned the Mann Act into an engine of government repression far beyond the white slave traffic.
-Prevented the executions of Japanese Generals
Yamashita and Homma, who had been condemned by
vengeful, drumhead military tribunals.
-Granted conscientious objectors a decent measure of
due process before they were inducted into the armed services and subjected to criminal prosecution.
-Prevented Louisiana from electrocuting Willie Francis after the first attempt failed.
-Placed clear restraints upon the witch-hunting activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
-Declared "separate-but-equal" unconstitutional in
the late 1940's.
"The dominant lesson of our history," wrote John P. Frank,
"is that the courts love liberty most when it is under pressure
least."I7 Mr. Justice Murphy was a notable exception.
In this, the third and concluding volume of his biography of
Murphy, Sidney Fine reconstructs an absorbing portrait of judicial
behavior on the nation's highest court during the Second World
War and the early days of the Cold War. Fine has tapped a rich
lode of manuscript materials, including the judicial papers of Murphy, William 0. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Wiley Rutledge, Hugo
Black, Robert Jackson, and Harlan Stone. Thanks to this volume
and the earlier work of Alpheus T. Mason,Is we probably know
more about this particular epoch in the Court's life than about any
other. We can speak with confidence about why certain issues were
resolved the way they were, about the give-and-take process of opinion writing, and about personal relationships among the Justices.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Olmstead v. United States, 276 U.S. 609 (1928).
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
Quoted inS. FINE, supra note 3, at 465.
A. MAsoN, HARLAN STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956).
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Much that Fine tells us about Murphy and his brethren adds a
few brush strokes to an old canvas. We witness the decline of Felix
Frankfurter's influence after the notorious decision in the first flag
salute case,I9 and the slow rise of Hugo Black's with regard toquestions of the first amendment and criminal justice in the states. In
painful detail, Fine recounts the growing bitterness between the
Black-Douglas-Murphy faction and the one led by Frankfurter and
Jackson, a conflict rooted in jurisprudential differences as well as
personal vanity and egotism. The rancor among Roosevelt's Justices (Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, and
Rutledge) made that of the "old" anti-New Deal Justices seem mild
by comparison.
The main surprises in the volume concern Justices Douglas
and Jackson. The former emerges as a clever opportunist (a view
long sponsored by Frankfurter) who always kept one judicial eye
trained on his future political career. The latter is found to be perhaps the most reactionary member of the Court with respect to the
question of racial segregation.
On three notable occasions discussed in depth by Fine, Justice
Douglas attempted to straddle issues in an effort to appease both the
political Left and Right. In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co. ,2o
the Justices enforced a series of World War I contracts made between the federal government and the steelmaker despite allegations
that the agreements, which yielded the company extraordinary
profits, had been made under "duress" and were "unconscionable"
as a matter of law. Douglas voted in the majority to enforce the
agreements, but he also filed a last-minute concurrence which argued that the agreements had contained an implied promise Bethlehem would achieve certain production efficiencies before reaping
the profits. Without convincing evidence on this point, they could
not collect the extraordinary profits. But because the lower courts
had resolved this point the other way, Douglas argued, he felt
bound by their decision. Douglas's concurrence outraged Murphy,
who had earlier rejected that analysis of the contracts, although he,
too, believed the profits to be excessive. "The Bethlehem case," he
told Frankfurter, "first put me wise to Bill Douglas."21
A year later, when a narrow majority on the Court overturned
the government's effort to strip Communist Party leader William
Schneiderman of his citizenship and deport him,22 Douglas again
19.
20.
21.
22.

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
315 u.s. 289 (1942).
Quoted in S. FINE, supra note 3, at 346-50.
Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
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sought to straddle a controversial question. He filed another concurring opinion which agreed that the prosecution had failed to establish fraud in the case, but also noted that Congress could
prohibit the naturalization of Communists if it desired to do so.
Murphy again expressed to Frankfurter his shock at Douglas's
"skulduggery" in seeking to appease the nation's anti-Communist
sentiments while at the same time blocking the Schneiderman
deportation.23
Finally, in the infamous Screws case,24 Douglas wrote an opinion which sustained the constitutionality of key provisions in the
Civil Rights Act of 1870, but reversed the conviction of the immediate defendant, a Georgia sheriff, who had beaten to death his Negro
prisoner. Douglas's opinion relied on the argument that the judge
had failed to instruct the jury that Claude Screws could be convicted only if the prosecution proved that he intended to "willfully"
deprive his prisoner of a right protected by the Constitution. Murphy wrote a scathing dissent which noted that "knowledge of a
comprehensive law library is unnecessary for officers of the law to
know that the right to murder individuals in the course of their
duties is unrecognized in this nation. "2s In his judgment, Douglas
was once again attempting to mollify two important constituencies
for his political future-the liberal, civil rights wing of the Democratic Party as well as the lily-white, segregationist bloc in the
South.
Murphy was prepared as early as the 1948 Sipue/ case26 to declare "separate-but-equal" educational facilities unconstitutional.
But not Justice Jackson, who voted against granting certiorari in
the case and admonished his brethren that "every discussion of
(the] race problem makes it worse."21 Jackson also voted to deny
certiorari in the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer 2s with the
blunt observation: "I would deny and you'll wish you had." 29
Gossip columnists and reporters poked fun at Murphy's sexual
peccadillos and at his juvenile efforts to participate in the war effort
by taking basic military training. Much to the chagrin of Chief Justice Stone, he insisted on wearing a military uniform to the Court
when the Justices met in Special Term to hear the pleas of the Nazi
saboteurs. His colleagues on the bench mocked his intelligence and
23.
24.
25.
26.
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S. FINE, supra note 3, at 414-15.
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
S. FINE, supra note 3, at 400-01.
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
S. FINE, supra note 3, at 563.
334 u.s. 1 (1948).
S. FINE, supra note 3, at 565.
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his religion behind his back. When Henry Wallace asked Harlan
Stone in 1943 if Murphy had "grown" in his job, Stone replied "He
can no more grow than that stone."Jo Justice Roberts and Judge
Learned Hand referred to him as "the Saint," "St. Francis," or
"Jesus, Lover of My Soul."JI But the Murphy who emerges in this
fine biography was a Justice of unusual courage. He took seriously
his oath to defend the Constitution and did a better job in that respect than any of his colleagues. He was not among those Justice
Jackson had in mind when he penned the following ditty in 1941:
Come you back to Mandalay
And hear what the judges say
As they talk as brave as thunder
And then run the other way.32

ON COURTS AND DEMOCRACY: SELECTED NONJUDICIAL WRITINGS OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. Edited
by Arthur Selwyn Miller.I Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press. 1984. Pp. xvi, 291. $29.95.

A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. By Arthur Selwyn
Miller. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xiv,
242. $29.95.
Ernest van den Haag 2
In Arthur Selwyn Miller, Judge J. Skelly Wright found an
ideal biographer, who shares his understanding, or, I would contend, misunderstanding, of the nature of law and of the role of
judges. In turn Professor Miller has found an ideal person to write
the foreword in Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., with whom he shares
not only a misunderstanding of the function of law, but also a remarkable inability to command the English language. A few in30.
31.
32.

/d. at 249.
/d. at 262, 266.
/d. at 263.
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